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BEGINNING THE ENDGAME: 
THE SEARCH FOR AN INJURY COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
ALTERNATIVE TO TORT LIABILITY FOR TOBACCO-RE-
LATED HARMS 
by Paul A. LeBel* 
The reference to an endgame in the title of this contribution to 
the Symposium is meant to sound both an optimistic and a pessi-
mistic note. The good news, one might argue, is that the key 
policy makers of our society have begun to think seriously about 
the many ramifications of a more widespread and detailed ap-
preciation of the relationship between the use of tobacco products 
and the resultant adverse effects on health. The bad news is that 
as we are poised to engage in the endgame, much of our thought 
seems to be confined within the molds that offer little promise 
for arriving at the most socially responsible outcome to that 
game. 
Legal developments in the safety and liability portions of the 
tobacco arena are currently progressing on six fronts. 1 In litiga-
tion to impose liability on members of the industry, there are 
claims to recover damages for harm to smokers as individual 
litigants and as members of classes of smokers, 2 claims to re-
cover damages for harm attributable to exposure to environmen-
tal (or ·second-hand) tobacco smoke,3 and claims by public au-
thorities to recover the costs of publicly funded health care for 
tobacco-related health problems.4 On the regulatory front, there 
are efforts at the federal, state, and local levels to control access 
• James Goold Cutler Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. The 
author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Stephanie Zapata. 
1. Paul A. LeBel, "Of Deaths Put On By Cunning and Forced Cause": Reality 
Bites The Tobacco Industry, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 615-33 (1997) (hereinafter 
cited as Tobacco Deaths). Criminal investigations are also proceeding at state and 
federal levels, but those are beyond the scope of this article, except to the extent 
that they might serve as a source of additional information about the industry and 
of additional pressure to reach closure on some of the outstanding safety and ~iability 
issues. 
2. !d. at 618-23. 
3. !d. at 625-26. 
4. !d. at 626-29. 
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to tobacco products, 5 to expand the information that is available 
about those products,6 and (to a considerably lesser extent) to 
affect the content of tobacco products. 7 
With the exception of the innovative use of Medicaid subroga-
tion claims by the state attorneys general in nearly half of the 
states, the litigation strategies that are being used involve ef-
forts to shape standard tort doctrines and procedural devices to 
fit the demands of the tobacco context. 8 Assuming that the sub-
stantive elements and the procedures can be made to accommo-
date liability for harm - in this case, harm caused by a product 
that is more accurately characterized as lethal rather than as 
defective - it is not at all clear that the public interest is best 
served by transferring great amounts of wealth from the tobacco 
industry to smokers and their heirs. 9 The daunting prospect of 
adjudicating tobacco tort claims by the hundreds of thousands 
calls into question whether we are capable of learning anything 
from the experience of mass injury litigation in such settings as 
asbestos, Bendectin, and silicone gel breast implants claims. 
On the regulatory front, even the more robust regulatory strat-
egies for tobacco are distinctive for their refusal to follow 
through on the full implications of the lethal and addictive na-
ture of the products. If nicotine is an addictive drug, 10 and if it 
is delivered to consumers in a carcinogenic and cardiopulmonary 
risky manner, 11 then the cautionary approach by the regulatory 
agencies is more a testament to the political realities than it is 
evidence of a principled consistency in regulatory concern.12 We 
5. Jd. at 631-33. 
6. Id. at 629-31. 
7. Jd. at 633. 
8. Professor Eades' commentary in this Symposium -offers a powerful critique of 
the use of tort remedies in this setting. Ronald W. Eades, A Comment on Professor 
Paul A. LeBel's Ideas for a Tobacco Injuries Compensation System, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 
495 (1997). 
9. The most cogent and compelling articulation of this skepticism has been put 
forward by Stanford Professor Robert Rabin. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of 
the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 876-78 (1992). 
10. The Food and Drug Administration has concluded that it is addictive. 61 FED. 
REG. 44,661 (1996). 
11. The versions of the federally mandated warnings in effect since 1984 are 
unambiguous on this point. 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1994). 
12. Professor O'Reilly's contribution to this symposium makes a compelling argu-
ment for the proposition that the agency is not required to go farther and faster 
than it has. James T. O'Reilly, Tobacco and the Regulatory Earthquake: Why FDA 
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have entered into the endgame, one might conclude, but we seem 
to be resigned to playing by using the questionable moves of the 
conventional model of tort liability and a deferential approach to 
an industry that still possesses considerable political influence. 
The principal papers and commentaries presented in this Sym-
posium offer many insightful views of quite distinguished people 
whose thoughts on tobacco litigation and regulation will advance 
the public debate and the legal understanding on this significant 
topic. My own views are deeply sympathetic on a number of 
levels to those who are advocating an enhanced liability exposure 
for the tobacco industry and to those who are supporting both 
the federal regulatory regime about to go into place and some 
even more robust efforts by states and municipalities on disclo-
sure and on use. 13 Nevertheless, and I hope not just to be 
contrarian, I propose to come at the current posture of the legal 
relationship between the nation's health and the tobacco indus-
try from a different perspective. Instead of beginning with the 
litigation and regulatory models and working out the conceptual 
and the practical difficulties of applying them to the tobacco-
related harm problem, I will start with the notion that thinking 
at the systemic level about injury compensation can lead us 
toward an approach that, if not superior to current paradigms, 
will at least help to inform the debate about the next round of 
legal responses to the problem. 
This is admittedly not the first effort at devising a compensa-
tion program for tobacco-related harms. For at least two decades, 
legal scholars have reacted to concerns about the appropriate-
ness of tort remedies in the cigarette context by offering sugges-
tions for creating an alternative method of resolving those claims 
and of lowering the incidence of harm associated with the prod-
ucts. 14 This occasion for looking anew at the possibility of con-
Will Prevail After The Smoke Clears, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 509 (1997). 
13. More specifically, I think that Professor Wertheimer is quite convincing when 
she argues that tobacco products are susceptible to the application of traditional and 
modern concepts of products liability. Ellen Wertheimer, Pandora's Humidor: Tobacco 
Producer Liability in Tort, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 397 (1997). My concern is what follows 
from that liability. In a real sense, then, my concern is not that we cannot make a 
case for liability, it is that we can. 
14. Richard C. Ausness, Compensation for Smoking-Related Injuries: An Alterna-
tive to Strict Liability in Tort, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1085 (1990); Donald W. Garner, 
Cigarettes and Welfare Reform, 26 EMORY L.J. 269 (1977). 
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structing a compensation system for tobacco-related harms is the 
result of the convergence of three developments: first, a growing 
body of federal and state experience with compensation programs 
in other settings; second, a sense of frustration that the lessons 
of such mass tort litigation experiences as the asbestos cases are 
having such little impact on the planning for the resolution of 
the tobacco injury problem; and third, a belief that the disclosure 
of the internal workings of the tobacco industry will prompt a 
call for serious action sooner rather than later. For those rea-
sons, the time is ripe for investing in a proactive approach to 
sketching the contours of an injury compensation for tobacco-
related harms. 
The ways in which a society deals with its citizens who have 
suffered injuries because of exposure to external sources of risk 
can be a telling indicator of the notions of justice that prevail in 
that society.15 Injuries can be viewed as occasions for applying 
notions of corrective justice, returning the victims as close as we 
can to the status quo ante, or they can be seen as opportunities 
for engaging in a more sweeping exercise in distributive justice, 
using the intervention in the post-accident setting as an occasion 
for redressing other inequalities. 16 Accidental harm can evoke 
communitarian principles, under which the burden of dealing 
with the consequences of the harm is spread over a wide base, 17 
or it can be seen as a matter for the injury victim to deal with 
under a more atomistic view of the person as an isolated unit, 
with strongly individualistic notions of personal responsibility 
and of culpability providing the critical concepts underlying a 
scheme for allocating losses. 18 
When one examines the multiple techniques of providing com-
pensation for injury in this society at the end of this millennium, 
one gets a perhaps unintended but probably quite accurate sense 
of the philosophical pluralism, if not muddle, that underlies a 
significant segment of American law and public policy. Compen-
sation for harm is accomplished through a wide variety of tech-
15. See generally DAVID G. OWEN, ed., PIDLOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF.TORT LAW 
(1995). 
16. Tony Honore, The Morality of Tort Law - Questions and Answers, in OWEN, 
id. at 78-90. 
17. Leslie Bender, Feminist (Re)Torts: Thoughts on the Liability Crisis, Mass 
Torts, Power, cind Responsibilities, 1990 DUKE L.J. 848 (1990). 
18. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77-163 (1881). 
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niques and mechanisms, some created by legislative intervention 
and others produced through the accretion of a centuries-long 
common law decision making process. Against that background, 
it is more appropriate to think of looking at multiple systems 
from which guidance might be sought in addressing a particular 
injury problem, than it is to think that one can identify a single 
organizing principle. 19 
The driving force behind this article is a belief that the cur-
rent situation with regard to tobacco-related harms offers an 
occasion for devising an injury compensation system that should 
be better able to accommodate the specific demands created by 
that situation than we would obtain by manipulating tort doc-
trines or by exercising reg\llatory authority that would likely be 
met with considerable political resistance that could produce a 
backlash that impacts other vitally important regulatory initia-
tives and liability doctrines. Such a system will be shown to 
deviate from our conventional understanding of tort law reme-
dies in substantial ways. 20 Indeed, labeling an approach as a 
search for an optimum injury compensation system implies in 
the present day terminology that one is looking for an alterna-
tive or a supplement to a traditional tort litigation model of 
providing compensation. 
In its broadest usage, the term "injury compensation systems" 
should encompass the full range of programs and mechanisms 
that can provide compensation to injured people. The oldest of 
the injury compensation systems in our legal heritage was what 
we would now describe as a first-party process, in which the 
injured person was generally required to draw on his or her own 
resources, including in many instances a network of extended 
family and charitable resources, to alleviate the consequences of 
a harm. 
By the middle of the Nineteenth Century, a general body of 
19. See lzhak Englard, The System Builders: A Critical Appraisal of Modem 
American Tort Theory, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 27, 68 (1980) (characterizing the attempts in 
"modern American scholarship in response to the crisis in tort law . . . to fashion an 
improved general theory of liability" as "doomed to failure"). 
20. A previous exercise along these lines in the drunk driving accident setting is 
PAUL A. LEBEL, JOHN BARLEYCORN MUST PAY: COMPENSATING THE VICTIMS OF 
DRINKING DRIVERS (1992). The problem posed by second-hand smoke was alluded to 
in that work as potentially susceptible to a compensation system solution. Jd. at 331-
34. 
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tort law rules and principles had taken shape and assumed a 
growing significance as a system for the allocation of at least 
some losses from the victim to those whose conduct was respon-
sible (usually their negligent conduct) for contributing to the 
harm. The compensation that was obtainable under these tradi-
tional tort rules tended to reflect a number of doctrinal features: 
(a) the ability to characterize as negligent (or even more highly 
culpable) the conduct of the person from whom compensation 
was sought; (b) the identification of a quite specific and 
particularistic causal relationship between that fault and the 
harm for which compensation was sought; (c) an ability to char-
acterize the injured person as being close to innocent in the 
production of the harm; (d) a skeptical attitude toward harm 
that was not tangible; (e) a process of determining legal responsi-
bility that required individual adjudication of the issues in con-
troversy; and (0 placement on the party seeking to relieve the 
burdens of production of legally sufficient evidence and persua-
sion by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The Twentieth Century has seen an expansion, and more 
recently some contraction as well, in the scope of tort law as an 
injury compensation system. Strict liability has emerged as a 
viable theory of responsibility in some significant injury contexts. 
While strict liability in its modern incarnation was initially 
thought to be appropriate in the case of the most dangerous 
activities,21 liability that was not ostensibly based on fault en-
joyed a three decade expansion in the realm of products liability 
claims.22 Recent developments in that field, however, reflect a 
considerable retreat from the full implications of applying truly 
strict liability in all but the simplest of product injury cases. 23 
More attenuated connections to an individual's harm have sup-
ported legal responsibility in a few exceptional situations.24 
21. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 {1977) {translating the "un-
successful containment" idea of Rylands v. Fletcher into a contemporary principle of 
liability for harm caused by abnormally dangerous activities). 
22. RESTATEMENT {SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A {1965). 
23. RESTATEMENT {THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILI'IY {Proposed Official Draft 
1997). 
24. The innovative approaches taken in a few of the DES cases stretch the indi-
vidual causation element well beyond its traditional shape. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott 
Labs., 607 P.2d 924 {Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 {1980) {initial adoption of mar-
ket share theory of liability); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37 {Wis. 1984), 
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984) (risk contribution theory of liability); Hymowitz v. 
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Comparative responsibility has flourished as a replacement for 
the traditional notion of tort .liability as an ali-or-nothing propo-
sition.25 The legal system has shown a greater willingness to 
consider harms other than readily apparent physical injury as 
deserving of compensation. 26 In some instances, resolution of 
tort claims on a basis other than case-by-case adjudication has 
been approved, 27 although again recent developments suggest a 
growing reluctance to consider such adjudicatory methods as 
appropriate in the settings where they might have the most 
significant impact.28 Finally, the burdens of production and per-
suasion have been eased for plaintiffs in some situations or im-
posed on defendants after a relatively minimal showing by plain-
tiffs.29 
Althougli the extensive modification of traditional tort law has 
been a significant part of the compensation picture of the last 
fifty years, the most noteworthy injury compensation develop-
ment in this century has been the introduction of a number of 
legislative compensation schemes that treat some types of inju-. 
ries to individuals as problems that require more of a social 
Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 944 (1989) (fur-
thest reach of market share theory, refusing to allow manufacturers of DES to excul-
pate themselves by disproving possibiliV of having caused the particular plaintiffs 
harm). 
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY (Council Draft 
No. 1 1996). 
26. See, e.g., Watkins v. Fibreboard Corp., 994 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1993) (recogni-
tion of claim for damages for fear of developing cancer from exposure to asbestos); 
Molien v. Kaiser Found. Hasps., 616 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1980) (negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress claim recognized for misdiagnosis of spouse with sexually transmitted 
disease). 
27. See, e.g., In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 
1984) (fairness opinion approving class settlement of claims that would have been 
unable to establish basis of liability as individual claims). 
28. See, e.g., Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996) (re-
jecting class certification for determination of some common liability issues in nation-
wide tobacco litigation); Georgine v. Amchem ]>rods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir.), cert. 
granted, 117 S. Ct. 379 (1996) (rejecting class certification for settlement purposes in 
asbestos litigation). 
29. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal.. 1978) (permitting plain-
tiff in design defect litigation to make minimal showing of causal relationship be-
tween design feature and harm, and then imposing burden of justification of that de-
sign feature on defendant); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 479 A.2d 374 (N.J. 1984) (im-
posing on pharmaceutical company the burden of proving that knowledge of the risk 
of a prescription drug was not within the scientific state of the art at the time of 
distribution). 
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solution than is likely to be obtained in the tort system. 30 The 
most significant of these alternative and supplemental compen-
sation programs - the workers' compensation systems at the 
state and federal levels- traces its roots to Nineteenth Century 
Europe, and has been well established in the United States since 
the second decade of this century. In recent years, compensation 
programs have proliferated as legislatures have sought to divert 
categories of harms from being adjudicated by the tort litigation 
process. 31 In a development that may be somewhat more sur-
prising, courts in the mass injury setting have now entered into 
the process of compensation program creation, utilizing a variety 
of procedural vehicles such as class action settlements, 32 and 
jurisdictional devices such as bankruptcy reorganization plan 
approval, 33 to accomplish that goal. 
As we approach the Twenty-first Century, the phenomenon of 
an injury compensation program that acts as an alternative or a 
supplement to traditional tort liability has assumed a newly 
vigorous role. The most useful conceptual underpinnings of an 
effort to construct an innovative compensation program are like-
ly to be found in the three-quarters of a century experience in 
providing compensation for workplace harm under the workers' 
compensation systems adopted in each of the states. That experi-
ence offers a significant insight both into the nature of the issues 
that are raised by compensating for injuries outside of the tradi-
tional tort arena and into the feasible contours of the resolutions 
of those issues. A good deal of the narrowly-focused injury com-
pensation program legislation in recent years draws from the 
workers' compensation experience, in both positive (benefiting 
30. These systems are qualitatively different from no-fault insurance legislation, 
which have the effect of treating harms as purely private insurance matters rather 
than as requiring a social solution. 
31. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10-300aa-34 (1994) (National Childhood Vaccine 
IJ\jury Compensation Act); FLA. STAT. §§ 766.301-766.316 (1988) (Birth Related Neu-
rological Injury Compensation); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 38.2-5000-38.2-5021 (Michie 1994) 
(Virginia Birth-Related Neurological Il\iury Compensation Act). 
32. See, e.g., In Re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 12521 (M.D. Ala. 1994). A revised settlement had to be fashioned after 
the bankruptcy petition by Dow Corning changed the amount and the sources of the 
funding available. 
33. See, e.g., In Re A. H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 694 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 959 (1989) (upholding central elements of district court approval of reorganiza-
tion plan establishing compensation program for victims of Dalkon Shield). 
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from the lessons in workers' compensation) and negative (failing 
to break through the confines of that experience) ways. The most 
recent of the significant conceptual advances in the law of injury 
compensation today occurs in the judicial arena, and one can 
take advantage of those developments as well by drawing on the 
experiences of the end-stage of the most innovative mass tort 
litigation to expand the range of options that one can put on the 
table when confronted with a new (or newly addressed) injury 
compensation problem. 
A good deal of the innovation in the law of injury compensa-
tion in the last quarter-century has appeared to operate from the 
premise that specific inadequacies of traditional tort law can be 
remedied by a more or less radical departure from the tort litiga-
tion model. Too many of these systems, however, particularly 
those that have been created through the judicial process, seem 
to be engaged in re-inventing the wheel. In a sense, the injury 
compensation system creative process appears mainly to have 
looked vertically to the tort model, and seems to have had as its 
primary focus an attempt to avoid the more unsatisfactory fea-
tures of that model. 
The search for an optimum compensation system would bene-
fit from the introduction of a different perspective on the devel-
opments in this area of law and policy. Such a search would look 
horizontally across the range of legislative and judicial compen-
sation systems to identify the lessons that can be learned from 
the experience of other systems and that can then be extended to 
this new context if it is thought to be suitable for some deviation 
from a tort litigation vehicle for injury compensation. 
I. THE GOALS AND THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF AN 
INJURY COMPENSATION SYSTEM 
The developing law of injury compensation systems is one of 
the most explicitly instrumental bodies of rules and processes in 
American jurisprudence. Legislatures and courts are generally 
inclined to turn to a search for an injury compensation system 
only when some significant problem is perceived with the ability 
of traditional tort litigation to accomplish its function of provid-
ing appropriate levels of compensation to those who legitimately 
deserve to be compensated. An important part of understanding 
this body of law, then, consists of an appreciation of when and 
why case-by-case litigation of individual tort claims is thought to 
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be inadequate. The starting point for the crafting of most of the 
programs currently in place thus seems to be an examination of 
what was occurring in the tort arena's disposition of claims aris-
ing from these injuries and an exploration of what were thought 
to be the drawbacks to that disposition. For that reason, the 
initial decision to move in the direction of an injury compensa-
tion system and the shape of the system that is constructed each 
might be characterized as responsive or reactive to a disappoint-
ment with the operation of the tort system. 
Equally important in the development of an injury compensa-
tion system as the sense of when a resort to tort law falls short, 
however, is an explicit identification of what an injury compensa-
tion system can hope to accomplish. It is only when the goals are 
known and the possible- tensions among them are appreciated 
that it is possible to make informed policy choices about how to 
structure a particular compensation program. Although there 
can be differences of opinion about the terminology to describe 
and the priority to assign to them,34 the goals of an injury com-
pensation system can usefully be understood as occupying four 
distinct categories: the compensation for loss, the enhancement 
of safety, the achievement of administrative efficiency, and the 
imposition of an appropriate internalization of injury costs. 
34. A recent study of the Federal Employers' Liability Act offered the following 
statement of the goals of an injury compensation system: 
Overall goals of injury compensation involve equity, efficiency, and incentives. 
Ideally, an injury compensation system should be equitable to the injured 
worker, should provide benefits in an efficient manner, and should be struc-
tured so that each party has incentives to reduce both injuries and the costs of 
those injuries that occur. . . . 
A system's efficiency and incentive structure can be assessed objectively, but 
the fairness of any particular system depends on more subjective perspectives 
or social philosophies of individuals or groups. The criteria that may be consid-
ered in judging the fairness of a particular injury compensation system, howev-
er, can be defined and investigated. They include the extent of coverage, in-
cluding who and what is compensated; the level of the compensation for losses; 
the speed with which the losses are compensated; the certainty with which 
they are compensated; and who bears the costs of compensation. 
Transportation Research Board, COMPENSATING INJURED RAILROAD WORKERS 
UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT 4 (1994). 
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A. The First Goal - Compensation for Loss 
To compensate for an injury is to take steps to offset the ad-
verse consequences attributable to the injury. Unlike the case in 
such legal regimes as property and contracts, the nature of the 
harm addressed by tort law generally does not lend itself to rem-
edies that restore the aggrieved person to the original state be-
fore the other person interfered with her or his rights. For the 
most part, our legal system accomplishes a compensatory func-
tion in the tort arena by requiring a party to make a monetary 
pay~ent to the injured person or to someone who has incurred 
an expense or suffered a loss because of the injury to the victim. 
Similar limitations in the ability to restore the injury victim to 
a pre-injury status exist when one resorts to a compensation sys-
tem outside of the tort arena. Perhaps the greatest advantage of 
an injury compensation system is the ability to focus attention 
and direct funds that anticipate and alleviate the impact of pro-
spective harms, as opposed to the predominantly retrospective 
focus of the tort liability system. Compensation programs can be 
constructed in particular contexts recognizing that some of the 
population will certainly be adversely affected in the future, and 
that some of those who are injured will certainly continue to 
incur losses after the initial injury. An injury compensation sys-
tem enables a society and its legal system to get ahead of the 
curve instead of continually playing catch-up in addressing an · 
injury problem. 
Compensation can be structured to cover a variety of losses, 
and it can extend to a range of people who are related to the 
victim in different ways. Major distinctions can be drawn among 
the types of compensation to highlight the options in choosing 
which of multiple compensatory goals are realistically achievable 
in a particular context. 
The basic theoretical distinction in compensation is between 
direct and indirect costs of injury.35 Within the category of di-
rect costs we find such items of loss as physical harm suffered in 
an incident, loss of income due to the inability to work, physical 
pain and suffering, and mental or emotional harm. Indirect costs 
35. Judge Calabresi characterizes this distinction as one between "primary" and 
"secondary" accident costs. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE CoSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL 
AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-28 (1970). 
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of injury include such matters as the loss of economic support to 
those who depend on the flow of income supplied by the injured 
party, loss of emotional support that would have been provided 
by the victim, and loss of companionship or consortium as a re-
sult of the injury. A rough counterpart of this distinction within 
traditional tort doctrine would be a distinction between claims by 
the victim of the tortious conduct and derivative claims that flow 
from a relationship to that victim. 
· The characteristic feature of injury compensation systems 
created by legislatures is their tendency to restrict compensation 
to pecuniary losses. The largest system, workers' compensation, 
typically limits benefits to medical and rehabilitation expenses 
incurred as a result of a workplace injury or occupational dis-
ease, a partial replacement of wage loss during periods of dis-
ability due to that injury or disease, and death benefits to those 
who are actually dependent on the deceased worker. The state 
programs to replace the part of the medical malpractice system 
that would otherwise apply in birth-related neurological injury 
incidents similarly exclude non-pecuniary loss from the compen-
sation that is provided.36 One of the compelling justifications for 
restricting compensation in this way has to be the recognition 
that when limited funds are available, the highest priority use of 
the funds is to alleviate the consequences of the injury that are 
most likely to produce disadvantageous social effects, as the 
victim's personal resources would have to be diverted from their 
other beneficial uses and devoted to dealing with the harm. 
The federal childhood vaccine injury compensation program is 
distinctive among injury compensation systems in its allowance 
of recovery for pain and suffering, with that recovery capped at 
$250,000.37 That compensation program has an opt-out provi-
sion, giving the vaccine injury victim an election to pursue a tort 
remedy following exhaustion of the statutory process,38 and is 
thus distinguishable from the exclusivity model that is common 
to most other compensation systems. Allowing recovery for pain 
and suffering, even if modest in amount by comparison to tort re-
36. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-5009 (Michie 1994) (authorizing compensation 
for actual medically necessary and reasonable care expenses, lost earnings, and the 
expenses of obtaining compensation). 
37. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(4) (1994). 
38. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-21(a) (1994). 
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covery standards, could play an important role in reducing the 
disincentive to accept the award decision that has been made 
within the compensation program. This would in turn lower the 
social costs of operating a compensation program and a tort 
litigation system for resolving the same claims. 
Because the relevant comparison when creating most injury 
compensation systems is to the tort liability system, there are 
limits on how much of a variation can exist between tort com-
pensation and the benefits available under the new system. Too 
large a difference can raise concerns about depriving potential 
tort litigants of a remedy without providing some corresponding 
gain. If the difference narrows too much, however, one might 
question what is achieved by the creation of the new system. 
For the broad-scale social contract arrangement of the 
workers' compensation systems, the trade-off metaphor offers a 
realistic and comforting image. Both categories of parties to the 
contract - employers and employees - receive and give up 
something of value under the system, with the public interest 
being served as well by the diversion of workplace harms into a 
compensation system that provides swifter and surer compensa-
tion at a lower expense than would be true within the tort sys-
tem. 
For the more narrowly tailored compensation programs of 
recent vintage, the smallest levels of benefits that are available 
tend to be found in the programs in which the likelihood of re-
ceiving any compensation in the tort system is lowest. Agent 
Orange victims who would have been unable to establish causa,;. 
tion on an individual basis thus were able to get quite modest 
payments under a compensation program that awarded relief to 
the class of people who were exposed to the herbicide.39 Similar-
ly, the divergence between the size of tort awards and the bene-
fits available in the compensation program established for 
Dalkon Shield victims as part of the A H. Robins bankruptcy 
reorganization plan were greatest for the class of claimants who 
proved none of the elements that would have been necessary had 
they pursued a tort remedy. 40 In contrast, those claimants who 
39. PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MAss TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE 
CoURTS 220·21 (1986). 
40. Georgene M. Vairo, The Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or 
Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 617, 630-34 (1992). 
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were thought to have the most viable tort claims were treated (in 
theory, at least) as if they would be given their full measure of 
tort damages from the compensation program. 41 
B. The Second Goal - Safety Enhancement 
The first-order justification for a compensation program is its 
delivery of funds to people whose i:qjuries have left them or their 
dependents at some disadvantage. As such, a program that oper-
ated only with a corrective or distributive aim could still be justi-
fied by pointing to its ability to reach that first-order goal. The 
case for a compensation program is likely to be strengthened, 
however, if it can be shown to have a positive effect in enhancing 
safety by reducing the frequency or the severity of injuries. 
Probably the most effective way of achieving a safety goal is 
action that is directed at the injury-producing conduct. Regula-
tion of workplace practices42 and consumer product bans43 are 
examples of this sort of safety-related action, as are the setting 
of highway speed limits44 and the installation of occupant pro-
tection systems in automobiles. 45 This kind of "specific deter-
rence"46 of risks of harm requires a level of understanding of 
the magnitude of the injury problem and the contributions of the 
various factors that play a role in its size and severity that is 
often difficult if not impossible to appreciate until the problem 
has blossomed into a social and legal crisis. In a real sense, then, 
the legal decision maker who anticipates a risk but is unsure of 
how best to address it through direct regulation is encountering . 
an open-textured situation characterized by the handicaps identi-
fied by Herbert Hart as associated with the legal authority who 
would prefer to govern through pre-announced rules: "relative 
ignorance of fact ... [and] relative indeterminacy of aim."47 The 
41. /d. at 636-46. 
42. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1994) (Occupational Safety and Health Act). 
43. 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1994) (Consumer Product Safety Commission ban of con-
sumer products). 
44. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-870 (Michie 1994) (setting of speed limit). 
45. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1994) (Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard for occu-
pant protection systems). 
46. The term is Calabresi's, and is used to distinguish the direct effect of reg-
ulation from the indirect effect of exposure to liability, referred to as "general deter-
rence." CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 95. 
47. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 125 (1961). 
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striking feature of the world in which people suffer injury is that 
events require decisions to be made after the fact about which 
there was prior ignorance and when the indeterminate aim to 
avoid harm could not realistically have been accomplished. 
In contrast to the use of direct regulatory action to avoid 
· harm, injury compensation programs produce their safety effects 
indirectly, if at all. Compensation obligations force an entity that 
might otherwise be legally and financially indifferent to the con-
sequences of its action to take into account the accident costs for 
which it will be held responsible. Employers who are liable for 
workers' compensation benefits for injuries that entail no realis-
tic exposure to tort liability are thus unable to be legally indiffer-
ent to those harms, and they may respond to that workers' com-
pensation obligation by taking steps to lower the risk of harm. 
Compensation obligations may also induce a previously insuffi-
ciently interested third party to become involved in making deci-
sions for safety. To use the workplace setting again, the contrac-
tual obligation to indemnify the employer for its workers' com-
pensation liability can induce the workers' compensation insur-
ance carrier to take two steps that would be expected to increase 
safety. First, it can tailor insurance premiums to the risk that 
the employer is actually posing to its work force, and second, it 
can conduct an inspection program to recommend or demand 
changes in work practices to lower the risk of employees suffer-
ing harm for which it is ultimately going to be responsible. Indi-
rect lowering of accident costs can occur, therefore, whenever the 
party who controls the risk modifies its behavior in order to low-
er its exposure to the payment obligation. 
One of the insights of the economic analysis of liability for 
product-related harms has been the safety effect that can occur 
even when the party in control of the risk lacks an economic 
incentive to lower the risk. If the expected liability costs were 
lower than the investment necessary to avoid the liability, the 
party would be acting rationally, all else aside, in paying its 
damages as they occur rather than changing its behavior to 
avoid liability. In such a situation, however, the imposition of 
legal responsibility for the harm suffered by the victims can 
cause the price of the goods or services posing the risk to rise 
above what it would be in the absence of a compensation respon-
sibility. If the price increase depresses demand, then one would 
expect fewer harms attributable to that risk to occur. 
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The emphasis in that last statement is necessary to highlight 
the limit on what is being claimed for the effect of an increased 
price. It is not necessarily true that the net effect of lower de-
mand for a risky product is a decrease in overall harm. 48 The 
empirical question that needs to be answered is how will the 
needs of the consumers who are priced away from the product 
now be met. If the answer is that those consumers will now en-
gage in riskier behavior, the final judgement about whether 
there has been a net social safety gain will require a calculation 
of the accident losses that are prevented by the consumers' reac-
tion to the higher priced product and the accident losses that are 
caused by the consumers' reaction to the higher priced product. 
The fact that harms associated with alternative means of 
satisfying consumer desire might increase does not necessarily 
undercut the argument for attempting to obtain the safety gain 
attributable to the price increase that is associated with an im-
position of legal responsibility for the harm. The net effect may 
still be positive in the sense that the harms attributable to what-
ever the consumers select as an alternative are more susceptible 
to direct regulation, or are easier to accommodate within existing 
legal and insurance regimes, or for some other reason pose less 
of a social problem than the harms associated with the product 
in question. 
Two points about the relationship between an obligation to 
compensate for harm and a predicted enhancement of safety 
need to be kept in mind. First, the actual effects of an imposition 
of legal responsibility for harm are likely to be complex and to 
vary from setting to setting. Second, the fact that empirical ques-
tions need to be answered should not detract from raising the 
hypothesis that the implementation of a new injury compensa-
tion system proposal can achieve a safety goal as well as provide 
48. Professor Ausness refers to this as an example of the economic phenomenon 
of the "second best." Richard C. Ausness, Product Category Liability: A Critical Anal-
ysis, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 423 (1997). The most obvious instance of this kind of effect 
is when consumers are priced out of the market for a safer but more expensive prod-
uct and choose as a substitute a product that is less expensive but more dangerous. 
That does not seem to be a plausible scenario for tobacco products. A different way 
in which the effect might occur, however, is that consumers change the manner of 
use of the more expensive product so that the risk is magnified. For a discussion of 
how smoker behavior might change in a way that enhances the riskiness, see LeBel, 
Tobacco Deaths, at 639-40. 
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compensation to those who are injured. 
C. The Third Goal -Administrative Efficiency 
Compensating for injury can require activity by a variety of 
public and private institutions, each of which involves an expen-
diture of some resources- money, time, energy- to make the 
two most critical determinations: whether a claimant is entitled 
to compensation, and if so, what benefits should be paid. A goal 
of administrative efficiency serves as a constraint on the achieve-
ment of compensatory and safety goals: soCiety as a whole is not 
well served when the cost of administering a compensation sys-
tem rises to a level that exceeds the compensation and safety 
gains associated with the system. Efficiency may not be the most 
important criterion with which to assess a compensation pro-
gram, but accomplishments on other dimensions would have to 
be extraordinarily important to justify a system that cost consid-
erably more to administer than it provided in compensation and 
safety.49 , 
The strongest lesson one can learn from the administrative 
experience of injury compensation systems is the cost of preci-
sion. In the tort system, there is considerable momentum toward 
increasingly refined allocations of responsibility. Under compara-
tive negligence affirmative defenses, for example, fault must be 
apportioned between plaintiffs and defendants. The fault shares 
of parties, and in some cases non-parties as well, must be deter-
mined to apply a comparative fault contribution rule in a joint 
and several liability setting. If joint and several liability is re-
placed, in whole or in part, with a proportional liability scheme, 
the share of responsibility of each person who contributed to the 
occurrence of the harm becomes even more critical to the deter-
mination of the extent to which a plaintiff will be compensated. 
The precision sought in these comparative responsibility doc-
trines comes at a price. The decision making demand on the fact 
finder becomes more complicated, and one might expect the pre-
sentation of evidence and arguments to be affected accordingly. 
49. This is, of course, one of the more compelling arguments in the arsenal of the 
critics of contemporary tort law, at least in such routine settings as the litigation of 
responsibility for losses suffered in automobile accidents. See generally JEFFREY 
O'CoNNELL, THE INJURY INDUSTRY AND THE REMEDY OF NO-FAULT INSURANCE (1971). 
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The risk of confusion and genuine error should rise as juries are 
presented with more complex decision making tasks. The ability 
of parties and their attorneys to predict outcomes would be an-
other factor that is affected by the introduction of new variables 
in the outcome. Although it is not clear that this would necessar-
ily impede settlement, 50 it is likely to increase the uncertainty 
in which settlement valuations of claims take place. 
Simplifying the determinations that a compensation system 
must make can reduce the cost of administering the system con-
siderably. In the Agent Orange program, for example, virtually 
all of the particularistic causation determinations were eliminat-
ed by the decision to treat the simple fact of exposure to the 
herbicide in Vietnam as the initial threshold element.51 Sophis-
ticated medical and vocational determinations of the nature of 
harm and the degree of disability can similarly be eliminated 
with rough categorical decisions about harm and benefit 
amounts. Issues that would appear to matter a great deal in the 
normal human reaction to an incident, such as who was at fault, 
might be pushed to the background or out of the picture alto-
gether in a compensation system, as is true of the workers' com-
pensation system. · 
Along with the simplified determinations that can be built into 
the threshold entitlement elements, a compensation system's 
efficiency can be increased by adopting decision making process-
es that deviate from the intensive scrutiny associated with the 
litigation model. Decisions can be made within an administrative 
process that resembles claims processing· of the insurance indus-
try more than it does the fact finding of civil litigation. To retain 
the administrative efficiency gains obtained at that first level of 
decision making, an injury compensation system can structure 
the further review of those decisions to minimize the chance that 
some later stage will reintroduce the trial-type process that was 
avoided in the first instance. 
While it is clear that the price of precision in making determi-
nations can be lowered, the decision making efficiency itself co-
50. One can imagine, for example, that the complexity of the litigation decisions 
increases the anticipated cost of litigating a claim, so that the expected return is 
lowered, making settlement more attractive. 
51. Harvey Berman, The Agent Orange Veteran Payment Program, 53 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 53 (1990). 
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mes at a cost that may be significant. An important part of the 
motivation for the comparative responsibility movement in tort 
law is a sense of fairness that is offended by asking only whether 
or not questions without going on to ask how much questions as 
well. The creators of an injury compensation system might antic-
ipate the charge of unfairly refusing to make fine discriminations 
among types of conduct and degrees of harm by making it clear 
what is the central aim of the system, and then structuring the 
delivery of benefits so that there is a strong correlation between 
the process that is used and the aim that is sought. 
One other feature of administrative efficiency needs to be 
considered. The discussion so far has focused on the costs of 
making decisions within the compensation system. The ·manner 
in which the .compensation system is coordinated with other 
systems and programs can have a significant effect on what the 
society as a whole invests in the solution of the injury problem. 
A desire to eliminate what appears to be wasteful expenditure of 
judicial resources can help to justify the abolition of the collater-
al source rule in tort law, for example. Instead of quantifying 
and determining responsibility for categories of harms that have 
been covered by other sources, a legal system might conclude 
that the best use of the civil justice system is to compensate for 
harm for which there is no other coverage. 
Injury compensation systems can address this issue in a num-
ber of ways, with two models at opposite ends of the spectrum. 
The injury compensation system can be set up so that the enti-
tlement to benefits is triggered only if other sources of compensa-
tion prove to be inadequate in a particular case. Under this mod-
el, the administrative costs of the compensation system would 
only be incurred when absolutely essential to accomplish the 
aims of the program. On the other hand, the injury compensa-
tion system can be established so that it is the compensation 
source of first resort, allowing society to avoid expenditures of re-
sources in the other arenas in which the effects of the harm 
would have to be addressed. Compensation systems can thus be 
structured so that they are supplemental or exclusive sources of · 
compensation. 
What needs to be understood is that there are two sources of 
justice concerns in creating an injury compensation system. An 
appearance of diverting legitimate claims from a tort liability 
regime where those claims would receive more generous treat-
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ment than they are given in the compensation system may seem 
unfair to the claimant. An appearance of extracting funds from 
entities who would bear no realistic exposure to tort liability 
may seem unfair to the parties who contribute to the financing of 
the compensation system. The most realistic prospects for an 
injury compensation system arise when there is a convergence of 
interests of the affected parties and the society as a whole, so 
that a responsible compromise can be brokered to accommodate 
the competing interests to the greatest extent feasible. 
D. The Fourth Goal -Appropriate Cost Internalization 
Interpalization of injury costs may initially strike an observer 
more as a process by which other goals are achieved rather than 
as an independent goal itself. It is certainly true that safety 
effects, for example, can be traced to a decision that a particular 
industry must take injury costs into account when it makes deci-
sions about how much to invest in safety. A legal system that 
imposes a compensation obligation on that industry uses the cost 
internalization process to induce producers and consumers to act 
in ways that promote greater safety. · 
Although the instrumental nature of cost internalization is 
clear, there is nonetheless some additional analytical clarity that 
can be achieved by focusing briefly on cost internalization as an 
end in itself. The starting point for a cost internalization analy-
sis is Guido Calabresi's question, ''What is a cost of what?"52 
That question is a matter of causation, asking when we can iden-
tify one factor as a cause of another. In the realms of theology 
and metaphysics, such an inquiry would look ultimately to first 
causes53 and draw on quite subtle distinctions.54 In the law of 
injury compensation, fortunately, the causal answer that under-
lies an appropriate measure of cost internalization is obtainable 
from a more concrete identification of burdens and benefits. 
Achieving appropriate cost internalization as a goal for an 
injury compensation system is actually the converse of Judge 
52. See CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 133. 
53. THOMAS AQUINAS, 1 SUMMA THEOLOGICA 33 (1948 ed.) (Q. 2, art. 3: proof of 
existence of God by reference to first efficient cause). 
54. ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, IN 2 COMPLETE WORKS 1552, 1555-57 (J. BARNES 
ed. 1984) (distinctions among four senses of causation). 
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Calabresi's prescription to avoid externalities. 55 The goal is to 
create a rough correspondence between those who enjoy the ben-
efits of an activity and those who bear the burdens. When the 
activity is the manufacture or the distribution of a product that 
has the capacity to injure, the appropriate focus is on whether 
the losses associated with those injuries are included within the 
costs of the industry distributing the product. If they are so in-
ternalized, then the price of the product will reflect the injury 
costs as part of the social cost of the product, and production and 
demand levels will be set accordingly. If they are not internal-
ized, then production and demand levels for the product will be 
inflated. Furthermore, in the absence of cost internalization, the 
injury costs that are externalized onto the victims will have to be 
borne by some segment of the population other than the produc-
ers and, through them, the full class of consumers of the product. 
It is the absence of cost internalization, not its appropriate uti-
lization, that leads to injury costs being spread across society as 
a whole. 
Within the contemporary law of products liability, even when 
the liability that is being imposed is putatively strict, the defec-
tiveness analysis specifically and deliberately narrows the bene-
fits and burdens comparison. The focus is on the risk that the 
product poses to the user or others and the benefits that the 
product offers to the consumers and others exposed to the risk. 
The overall economic benefit of the product is supposed to be 
excluded from the analysis, as is the economic burden associated 
with decreasing the availability or the affordability of the prod-
uct. 56 It matters to that analysis, for example, whether people 
who would benefit from an unavoidably risky prescription drug 
are deprived of that benefit; it is not supposed to matter whether 
the pharmaceutical industry must downsize its workforce as a 
response to the exposure to products liability. 
Approaching an injury problem through the vehicle of an inju-
ry compensation system provides room for thinking comprehen-
sively and systemically about the overall social good that can be 
accomplished through the program. Determinations that are in 
55. CALABRESI, supra note 35, at 144-50. 
56. See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986) 
(improper to include social benefits from production of cigarettes as factor in 
risk/utility analysis). 
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the broader public interest may be easier to make in the course 
of global solutions to problems than they are in the more piece-
meal fashion of the adjudicatory process. Those who inquire 
about the effect of liability on the farm economies of tobacco 
growing states or the industrial economies of cigarette manufac-
turing states are met with indifference in the liability theories of 
tort law. Such concerns are legitimately incorporated into a con-
sideration of the optimal social solution to a widespread social 
problem. 
E. The Essential Elements of an Injury Compensation System 
As the preceding discussion of the goals of an injury compen-
sation system suggests, the emerging law of injury compensation 
systems draws on a variety of statutory and regulatory enact-
ments and common law precedent, dealing with a wide range of 
substantive, procedural and remedial issues. Although one might 
be tempted to abandon an attempt to systematize and synthesize 
such a hodge-podge of programs, that temptation can be resisted 
if one keeps focused on a core of five major issues that the study 
or the creation of any injury compensation system will be re-
quired to address.57 
i. The defining issue for an injury compensation system is what 
is the basis of entitlement to compensation. 
The entitlement to compensation sets the parameters for the 
system. More than any other element of a compensation pro-
gram, the basis of entitlement captures the essential aim of the 
program and defines how much fle.xibility there is likely to be in 
the construction of the other elements of the program. 
The basic question at the heart of an injury compensation pro-
gram is the identification of the injury compensation problem. 
The creation of a system requires careful thought about the na-
ture of the problem, and of how it is possible to address it in this 
57. AB is true of statements of the goals of an injury compensation system, differ-
ent commentators might choose among various terms for the essential issues that 
need to be addressed. In a recently published proposal for a compensation program 
in the contaminated blood products setting, Professor Andrew Klein has identified the 
major components of the program as jurisdiction, funding, compensation, and access 
to the tort system. Andrew R. Klein, A Legislative Alternative to "No Cause" Liability 
in Blood Products Litigation, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 107 (1995). 
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manner. Is the problem that too many harms are occurring? Is 
the problem that too many injured parties are being left to their 
own devices to deal with the consequences of the harm? Is the 
problem that the litigation system reaches too many results 
thought to be socially undesirable? Is the problem that the litiga-
tion system reaches generally appropriate results but at an unac-
ceptable cost? Is the problem the lack of a prospective focus, so 
that the injury compensation system could be seen as trying to 
get ahead of the curve of a massive number of claims instead of 
playing catch-up in the way that the tort litigation system gener-
ally does? The shape of the program will be responsive to the 
answers to these different questions. 
Compensation programs can be set up so that they resemble 
the zero-based proof attitude of the litigation system, in which 
the decision maker begins with a clean slate and nothing hap-
pens until the claimant satisfies an evidentiary burden that is 
fact specific to the claim. Much of the attractiveness of the com-
pensation system approach lies in the ability to make appropri-
ate decisions without a high investment in fact finding, and in 
order to realize that attraction, the entitlement to compensation 
would have to be set in a more categorical way. Presumptions of 
entitlement built into the system from the start are a quite use-
ful way of streamlining the process, 58 as are predetermined lev-
els of benefits for particular showings of harm. 59 
ii. Once the threshold for obtaining compensation has been 
determined, the next issue that needs to be addressed is what is 
the compensation that the system will provide to those who cross 
that threshold. 
Given the genesis of many injury compensation systems in 
particular dissatisfactions with the tort system in place at the 
time the system is created, it is not surprising that the questions 
58. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1994) (Vaccine I~Uury Table containing condi-
tions and time of onset to· qualify as a vaccine-related injury for purposes of compen-
sation under the National Childhood Vaccine I!Uury Compensation Act). 
59. The intermediate group of claimants in the Dalkon Shield compensation pro-
gram, those with proof of the use of the device and medical evidence of their condi-
tions but who faced problems with alternative causes of their conditions, were com-
pensated according to a schedule resembling a workers' compensation schedule for 
loss of body parts. RONALD J. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON 
SmELD BANKRUPTCY 313 (1991). 
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at this stage of system creation tend to turn on how closely the 
compensation will correspond to the damages that would be 
available if the claimant were successful in a tort action. 
The basic choices to be made on this element of the system 
involve different sets of variables. One of the variables is the 
level of compensation: should the system attempt to provide total 
compensation or should there instead be an acknowledgment 
that the compensation is only partial. Another variable is the 
position that the compensation system occupies in the universe 
of potential sources of compensation: is the system the payor of 
first resort or is it instead a compensation source that comes into 
operation only for otherwise uncompensated harm. Related to 
that variable is the choice of whether to extinguish other claims 
that may arise out of the incident or exposure giving rise to the 
harm or to allow tort actions to proceed against those who oc-
cupy a third party status to the relationship between the injury 
victim and the enterprise that is held responsible through the 
compensation program. 
The interaction between those sets of variables can help to 
shape the program. • The availability of, and the likelihood of 
success on, third party claims can relieve some of the financial 
pressure on the compensation system, for example, which can in 
turn affect the level of benefits that can be afforded for those 
who do not have access to a third party recovery. Similarly, a 
decision to make the program a supplemental source of compen-
sation can affect the demands that are placed on the funds that 
are available, opening up further possibilities for deciding what 
harm is compensable in what amounts. 
If the claimant is given options of accepting the award made 
within the compensation system or pursuing a tort remedy, then 
the compensation that is available within the system has to be 
generous enough to provide an incentive to accept the system's 
award. That generosity is, of course, less needed as the prospect 
of success in the tort litigation declines. 
iii. Given the basis and the nature of compensation, the creators 
of an injury compensation system must decide what is the source 
of the funds for compensation. 
The workers' compensation system employs a variety of tech-
niques for assuring adequate funding for claims for compensa-
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tion. Some states create funding bodies from which compensation 
is paid, but the predominant mode of financing workers' compen-
sation benefits is insurance obtained on the commercial market 
or, in the case of the more financially sound entities, self-insur-
ance. When the decisions about compensation make the system 
resemble a social welfare benefit more than a liability determi-
nation, it is probably best to see the source of funds as a tax on 
the enterprise that has produced the harm. 
The appropriate taxing unit is a decision that has to be made 
in the construction of a compensation program. Childhood vac-
cines, for example, are taxed on each dose produced by the phar-
maceutical industry, but the tax rate varies among the vaccines 
according to the risk of injury associated with each vaccine.60 If 
the risk is generally uniform across the enterprise that is being 
held responsible for financing the program, then the cost of ad-
ministration of the system can be kept lower due to the absence 
of a need to make differential risk determinations affecting the 
financial obligations of individual contributors to the funding of 
the program. At the outset of a program where the risk variation 
is a matter of uncertainty, cost effectiveness in administration 
may call for an initial uniform assessment, with an on-going and 
periodic review process to determine whether the rate should be 
changed to reflect actual claims experience. 
iv. An injury compensation system must address the question of 
what procedures are to be used for making the two critical 
determinations: whether compensation should be awarded, and if 
so, how much compensation an individual claimant should 
receive. 
One of the major advantages of an injury compensation system 
is the opportunity to lower the costs of making the critical deter-
minations of whether and how much compensation should be 
awarded. Although some states direct contested workers' com-
pensation cases to the trial court of general jurisdiction, it is 
more common to find the first level of decisions made by admin-
istrative agencies, with subsequent judicial review in a trial 
court or, more commonly, directly to an appellate court. Compen-
60. 26 U.S.C. § 4131 (1994) (tax on vaccines, the revenues of which are appro-
priated into the Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund under 26 U.S.C. § 9510). 
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sation programs may set up special administrative bodies to 
make the decisions, as was the case with the Dalkon Shield 
Claimants' Trust.61 The creation of a new compensation pro-
gram may involve subcontracting the decision making to an 
outside body, as in the Agent Orange experience,62 which might 
seem a particularly attractive option when the decisions are 
essentially insurance payment matters rather than complicated 
or contestable factual determinations. Decisions can also be 
made within a currently existing judicial structure, as with the 
special masters of the Court of Federal Claims63 or within the 
bankruptcy proces·s in the federal district courts. 
v. Finally, an injury compensation system must contain a clear 
process for determining how the compensation provided within 
the system is to be coordinated with the tort system and with 
collateral sources of compensation for the harm covered by the 
system. 
The options on this component of an injury compensation 
system include three basic models. Drawing on the experience 
with workers' compensation systems, the benefits available un-
der the new system can be considered the exclusive remedy that 
is available to the injured person. The federal vaccine injury pro-
gram employs a model of election following exhaustion; the in-
jured person is required to proceed into the compensation pro-
gram, but at its termination, the claimant is entitled to reject 
the result obtained within the system and pursue a tort remedy, 
albeit under a tort regime that is altered by substantive and pro-
cedural requirements set out in the legislation. The new compen-
sation system might also be seen as a supplement to the existing 
· tort liability system, stepping in to provide compensation for 
those who are not compensated or who are undercompensated 
under the prevailing doctrines of tort law.64 
61. Vairo, supra note 40, at 630-31. 
62. Berman, supra note 51. 
63. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12 (1994) (conferring jurisdiction on Court of Federal 
Claims to determine entitlement and amount of compensation under the National 
Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program). 
64. Professor Eades' commentary suggests that the compensation program funded 
by a tax on tobacco products, along with regulatory efforts, "should be merely an 
adjunct to the traditional tort system." Eades, supra note 8, at 495. In an earlier 
effort to construct a system for compensating victims of drunk drivers, the author 
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II. SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE CONTOURS OF 
AN INJURY COMPENSATION SYSTEM FOR TOBACCO-
RELATED HARMS 
Taking the general observations of the preceding section about 
the genesis of injury compensation systems and applying them to 
the situation we find when we examine the current legal posture 
of the tobacco industry in this country raises more questions 
than it provides answers. Approaching the issue in a systematic 
way and at a systemic level should, however, offer some instruc-
tion about what are - and perhaps even more importantly, what 
are not - useful avenues to pursue. 
When one considers the goals of an injury compensation sys-
tem, some are easier to achieve in a tobacco setting than others. 
At first glance, compensation would appear to be considerably 
more difficult to accomplish than would the achievement of the 
goals of reducing the risk of harm and of forcing the industry to 
internalize the costs of tobacco-related harms into the industry's 
operating expense. Containing within manageable levels the 
administrative expenses of any program established to provide 
those benefits is also problematic in any system that would at-
tempt to provide a counterpart to tort damages for individual 
victims of tobacco-related harms. 
Compensation of tobacco product users for their individual 
harm is difficult to reconcile with tobacco-related harms on both 
a conceptual and a practical level. One of the more distinctive 
features of tobacco-related harms is that the bulk of those harms 
occur to the people who voluntarily begin to use the products 
which, at least for some time now, have been accompanied by 
warnings of the risks that these harms will occur. In this sense, 
then, much of the harm that tobacco causes cannot be character-
ized as occurring to people who. fit the traditional understanding 
of "innocent victims." This aspect of the problem raises two possi-
bilities, in the sense that there are two different routes we might 
follow. 
The first possible response is that a compensation system 
needs to be devised in such a way as to exclude from access to 
chose this option. LEBEL, supra note 20, at 290-92. On reflection, it is not clear that 
the same choice would be made by the author even in that setting today, given legit· 
imate concerns about duplication of decision making tasks and the resultant higher 
costs of administration, compared to an exclusivity model. 
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the compensation provided by the system the "willing partici-
pants" in the risky behavior that leads to the harm. Such a re-
sponse is deeply embedded in traditional tort ways of thinking 
about injury compensation. The defense of assumption of risk 
raised a total bar to recovery for more than a century of our 
experience with fault-based jurisprudence. In the pockets of 
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities, assumption of 
the risk that made the activity abnormally dangerous has re-
mained a defense. As a strict tort liability theory emerged for 
products cases, the product user's unreasonable decision to use 
the product knowing of the defective condition was retained as 
an affirmative defense. 65 
A reluctance to expend limited resources on those who know-
ingly encounter a risk for no good reason is responsive to a fun-
damental notion of personal responsibility. Indeed, in an earlier 
work on compensating the victims of intoxicated drivers, the 
author specifically excluded from. a new compensation system 
proposal any possibility of recovery by the drinking drivers or 
those whose claims were derived from the drinking drivers.66 
That kind of restriction in the tobacco setting would not neces-
sarily leave the system with nothing to do. Passive smoking 
victims who are injured by environmental tobacco sinoke would 
constitute a presumably large class of persons who fit the profile 
of classic innocent victims. 
It would thus be possible to design a system that excluded 
claims for compensation by the users of tobacco products. The 
question then becomes whether we should do that, or whether 
instead there is something about the tobacco injury context that 
undermines this initial reluctance to include product users with-
in the class of those who are entitled to compensation of some 
sort. The possibility of finding that contextual peculiarity is 
heightened if we consider the second response to the issue of 
whether smokers should be treated as willing participants rather 
than as innocent victims. 
The second and different response to the characterization 
question is that the moral responsibility for the adverse effects 
on the nation's health is so widely disproportionate when one 
considers the tobacco industry and the users of its products that 
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. n (1965). 
66. LEBEL, supra note 20, at 297-99. 
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any qualms that we might have about rewarding people for their 
bad behavior should be set aside. It is one thing for society to 
view with special disfavor a driver who chooses to become intoxi-
cated and then exposes himself and others to the enhanced risk 
of death on the highway. It is quite another thing for society to 
view with the same level of disapproval people who succumb to 
the sophisticated marketing efforts that result in the addiction of 
the youngest segment of the consuming population to the prod-
ucts whose full risks are unlikely to be conveyed by the manufac-
turers or appreciated by the consumers at the critical and vul-
nerable age when lifestyle choices are being made. The bipolar 
world of willing participants and innocent victims fails to capture 
the reality of a consuming population who became addicted at a 
time when in every way except for the government-mandated 
warnings the industry downplayed and denied the health risk. 
Support for a response that is more tolerant of the choices 
initially made by those who are injured can be found both in 
contemporary tort law and in the experience of other compensa-
tion systems that have been developed as alternatives to tort 
litigation. One of the most widely adopted modifications in tort 
doctrine in recent years has been the shift in the treatment of 
plaintiffs' conduct defenses from total bars to recovery to bases 
for comparative reductions in the arn,ount of recovery. A fre-
quently adopted corollary to the comparative negligence doctrine 
has been the limitation of the assumption of risk defense to 
those situations in which the decision to encounter the known 
risk was unreasonable, viewed in objective terms. Within 
workers' compensation, the injury compensation system with 
which we have the longest experience, it has long been the case 
that only the most egregious fault on the part of the injured 
employee would act as a barrier to a full entitlement to the bene-
fits of the compensation system. 
The experience of opening access to compensation for those 
whose fault has contributed to their harm would be a stronger 
precedent to follow if other goals would be accomplished by doing 
so, and if the most problematic forms of compensation were ade-
quately addressed. When one looks at those other goals in the 
tobacco setting, the grounds of support for expanding the range 
of compensation to include some of the harms suffered by tobacco 
product users become apparent. 
Achieving an appropriate measure of cost internalization in 
486 NORTHERN KENTUCKY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 24:3 
the tobacco setting is a goal that is going to be met in the near 
future only if there are litigation breakthroughs of one sort or 
another, or if a specially tailored program is adopted to shift 
some of the costs of those harms to the industry. With very few 
exceptions, the harms attributable to the use of tobacco products 
have been successfully externalized by the industry that manu-
factures and distributes those products. A curious feature of the 
contemporary tobacco litigation scene is that significant costs are 
being internalized by the industry, but those sums in the tens (or 
hundreds67) of millions of dollars are the costs of defending 
against any legal responsibility for the harm that the products 
have caused. Acknowledging that responsibility and then par-
ticipating in an appropriately designed compensation system 
would divert that socially wasteful expenditure into channels 
that would actually accomplish some public good. 
A compensation program that was limited to environmental 
tobacco smoke victims would be the easiest to justify on cost 
internalization grounds. For those harms of smoking, the bur-
dens of dealing with the consequences of the product's use are 
visited on a segment of the population that enjoy none of the 
benefits of that use. Shifting the costs of their harms to the in-
dustry would be in accord with the classical restorative justice 
notions embodied in contemporary economic ideas of matching 
benefits and burdens through cost internalization mechanisms of 
private and public law. 
An injury compensation system that reached more broadly so 
that the harms of product users who in some sense share the 
responsibility for their health-impaired condition could be com-
pensated also has analogical support on cost internalization 
grounds. In the workers' compensation setting, for instance, 
careless workers and their resultant injuries are seen as an 
inevitable incident of the employment enterprise, and the costs 
of those injuries are thought to be appropriately incorporated 
into the operating costs of the employing enterprise and then 
into the prices paid for the goods and services of that enterprise. 
A quite similar line of thinking would be applicable to a tobac-
co injury compensation system that included product users 
among its beneficiaries. Smoking-related harms are the most 
67. In a discussion following the presentation of the papers at this Symposium, 
the figure of $600 million dollars in defense costs annually was mentioned. 
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predictable, indeed certain, of the consequences of distributing 
cigarettes, and a legal system that allowed the industry to con-
tinue to externalize the costs of those harms would allow the 
industry to understate its costs of operation significantly. 
Because those costs have to be allocated somewhere, treating 
them as matters for the tobacco industry to internalize would 
relieve the financial burden on some other sources of public and 
private compensation. Including smokers as persons whose 
harms were included within the scope of a tobacco injury com-
pensation system would make explicit what is implicit in the 
compensation provided to injured consumers through products 
liability litigation. Part of the price of the product reflects access 
to a system for shifti.ng accident costs away from the victim and 
for spreading those costs over a different base than the one that 
would bear the costs if they were not shifted. Automobiles, for 
example, are marginally more expensive because a potential 
recovery of damages for harm caused by defective automobiles is 
part of the package obtained by the purchaser. Likewise tobacco 
products could be priced at a level that reflects the opportunity 
for those harmed by the products to recover some of the costs of 
those harms. 
Cost internalization in this sense is appropriately seen as a 
form of insurance, albeit one that operates more as a tax than a 
voluntary decision to purchase coverage in the commercial insur-
ance market.68 Two questions follow from that understanding, 
however. First, is the cost being internalized by the appropriate 
enterprise? Second, is the system by which compensation is pro-
vided the most appropriate method for delivering the compen-
sation? Each of those questions is answered in large part by 
considering in the tobacco setting the remaining goals of an 
injury compensation system. The risk reduction objective points 
strongly toward the tobacco industry as an appropriate institu-
tion on which to impose some of the costs of the harm caused by 
tobacco products, while the administrative efficiency goal is best 
served by a compensation system that is financed through a 
68. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: To-
ward First Principles, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 427, 486 n.251 (1993) (''To the extent 
that the [loss] spreading mechanism [of products liability] extracts premiums from 
persons involuntarily, its funding mechanism should be considered a form of taxa-
tion."). 
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specially earmarked tax on tobacco products that is used to ad-
dress a limited segment of the financial consequences of tobacco-
related harms. 
The safety enhancement goal for a compensation system in the 
tobacco setting is more readily achievable than virtually any 
other objective. An increase in the cost of the tobacco product is 
likely to produce a corresponding decrease in demand, particular-
ly among the younger users who are at the critical age when 
they are most likely to become addicted long-term users. What-: 
ever method is used to force the industry to internalize the costs 
of the harm that their products cause will almost certainly have 
as a beneficial effect a reduction in the volume of those harms. 
This exercise in thinking through the options for an injury 
compensation system grew out of a set of reflections on the rap-
idly changing legal posture of the tobacco industry in the sum-
mer of 1996.69 The most promising of the developments sur-
veyed in that article was a surtax on tobacco products enacted 
through voter referendum in three states. 70 The revenues from 
that supplemental excise tax were earmarked for special pro-
grams that would lower the cost of tobacco harms, both by sup-
porting efforts to lower the smoking rate and by subsidizing 
measures to treat people with smoking-related health problems. 
That kind of tax increase supporting particular programs is an 
eminently defensible piece of social policy. It accomplishes some 
shifting of injury costs to the industry that has, for the most 
part, successfully externalized those costs, and it does so in a 
way that may increase the price to reflect its social cost more 
than is currently the case. The lesson that emerges from the 
economic analysis of injury compensation is that the tax increase 
itself is likely to produce a beneficial effect if demand for the 
products declines. The search for an appropriate compensation 
program begins from that point, but it remains the most power-
ful justification for addressing the tobacco injury problem 
through a vehicle outside of the traditional tort litigation system. 
Administrative efficiency, if not viewed as a fully independent 
goal, at least serves as an important side constraint on the meth-
ods that are used to achieve other ends. In the tobacco setting, 
69. LeBel, supra note 1. 
70. The state referenda were passed in California in 1988, in Massachusetts in 
1992, and in Arizona in 1994. See id. at 635-47. 
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the foundation for collecting the funds for an effective compensa-
tion program is already in place, in the form of the excise tax 
structure that is imposed on tobacco products by the federal and 
state governments. Distribution of funds to those harmed by the 
products is more problematic, largely because the phenomenal 
marketing success enjoyed by the industry has made the occur-
rence of those harms quite widespread. 
Administrative efficiency notions play a role in making the 
centrally shaping decision of whether an injury compensation 
system in the tobacco setting should exclude claims by those who 
use the products. The effects of consumption of tobacco products 
are not signature diseases in the sense that asbestosis is unique-
ly attributable to exposure to asbestos fibers. 71 What that 
means is that a smoker who presents a particular health prob-
lem may have multiple factors in his or her personal history and 
the environment that arguably contribute to that problem. 
The multiplicity of causal factors could lead to a decision to 
exclude smokers from access to the compensation program for 
tobacco-related harms in the absence of a showing of predomi-
nance of smoking as a causal explanation of the claimant's condi-
tion. Such a decision would, however, understate the complicity 
of the tobacco industry in the health risk that its product users 
face. More promising as a source of guidance in this setting is 
the experience in the workers' compensation setting of attribut-
ing responsibility and thus opening access to the program as 
long as there is a minimal showing that the relevant factor (in 
this case it would be the use of the tobacco products rather than 
the occupational exposure to harmful substances) was a signifi-
cant contributing factor to the claimant's current condition.72 
Drawing on those functional considerations, and appreciating 
the tensions between and among various goals in the tobacco-
related harm setting, a tentative shape for a tobacco injury com-
71. At least not yet. One of the evidentiary issues in Brown & Williamson To-
bacco Corp. v. Carter, 680 So. 2d 546 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) was whether the 
kind of cancer that the plaintiff suffered was consistent with exposure to the tobacco 
smoke byproducts. Medical science may become capable of specifically linking tobacco 
use and particular cancers in the future. 
72. See, e.g., Rutledge v. Tultex Corp., 301 S.E.2d 359 (N.C. 1983) (occupational 
disease established if claimant shows that workplace exposure to cotton dust signifi-
cantly contributed to the development of the disease; exposure does not have to be 
sole cause of disease). · 
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pensation program begins to emerge. The remainder of this sec-
tion of the article will sketch the major elements of this initial 
approach to constructing an injury compensation system in this 
complex and politically charged environment. 
The most realistic and manageable method of establishing a 
basis of entitlement to benefits from a tobacco injury compensa-
tion program would be for the creator of the program to con-
struct a schedule of harms comparable to the Vaccine Injury 
. . 
Table in the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Act.73 In that legislation, Congress established a list of condi-
tions related to each of the vaccines covered by the Act, with a 
time within which each condition would normally be expected to 
occur if it were in fact vaccine related. The occurrence of the first 
onset or a substantial aggravation of one of the Table conditions 
within the period specified in the Table creates a presumption 
that the victim is entitled to compensation under the Act. 74 In 
the absence of the presumption from the Vaccine Injury Table, 
the claimant bears the burden of proving that he or she has 
suffered a vaccine-related injury.75 
No one would suggest that the task of creating such a tobacco 
harm schedule is anything but breathtakingly complex, but it is 
perhaps the most critical preliminary step in fashioning a system 
that is manageable and affordable. The experience in administer-
ing the Black Lung Act suggests that time and energy invested 
in setting the right threshold at the outset would be more than 
repaid in the avoidance of subsequent difficulties in determining 
access to compensation in a way that does riot convert the sys-
tem into a general health insurance program. 76 
Once a working definition of tobacco harm is accomplished 
through the construction of a tobacco harm schedule, the ques-
tion becomes what is to be done with what has been identified as 
tobacco-related harm. Monetary payments made to individuals 
seem to be the least justifiable use of the funds that would be-
come available in a tobacco injury compensation program. The 
maximum attainment of the multiple goals of the system would 
73. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-14 (1994). 
74. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-ll(c)(l)(C)(i) (1994). 
75. 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-ll(c)(l)(C)(ii) (1994). 
76. See PETER S. BARTH, THE TRAGEDY OF BLACK LUNG: FEDERAL COMPENSATION 
FOR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE (1987). 
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be best achieved if the benefits were instead used to supplement 
the privately and publicly financed health care resources avail-
able to the population at large. Drawing on but expanding the 
theory underlying the claims by the state attorneys general, that 
the use of tobacco products has produced a health care cost that 
is being subsidized by various segments of the population, the 
compensation from this program could be provided in the catego-
ries which follow. 
A. For victims who suffer harms on the tobacco harm schedule and 
who are covered by health insurance, benefits would be provided to 
reimburse the victim for the difference between the actual cost of the 
health care for those harms and the insurance coverage that is 
available to the individual. · 
This benefit of the compensation program would generally fall 
into two categories. For individuals whose insurance coverage 
has not been exhausted, the compensation would be in the 
amounts of the deductibles or co-payments required for the 
health care. These benefits would be available both for privately 
insured individuals and for those who are covered by Medicare. 
For those individuals whose health care has exhausted the major 
medical provisions of their insurance, the compensation would be 
in the amount of the health care expenditures, in the same way 
that uninsured individuals would be compensated below. 
B. For uninsured victims of harms on the tobacco harm schedule, 
benefits would take the form of payments to the health care 
providers who perform care for those harms. 
For this category of benefits, the program would act as a sub-
stitute for the Medicaid agency within the state where the care 
is provided. Instead of treating the health care as a public ex-
pense, the injury compensation system would treat it as an ex-
pense attributable to the tobacco industry to be funded through 
the compensation program. Payments would be made to the 
providers, not to the victims, and the payments would be made 
for the services as they are provided, eliminating any need to 
determine a lump-sum amount for future medical expenses. 
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C. For tobacco-related deaths, as determined according to the 
tobacco harm schedule, a death benefit of a modest amount would 
be payable to the estate of the decedent. 
The purpose of this form of payment is largely symbolic, but 
experience in the law of injury compensation systems has sug-
gested that symbolic payments can produce a beneficial effect. 77 
The most important social fact about tobacco products is that 
when used in their intended ways, they produce disabling and 
fatal conditions. The sort of "terminal benefit" contemplated in 
this provision of the tobacco injury compensation program ac-
knowledges the role that tobacco products play in the pathology 
of the American public. 
As an incidental positive effect; the death benefit undercuts 
the curious argument that tobacco deaths actually produce a 
public good in the form of deaths that lower the long-term health 
care costs of people who would live longer were it not for their 
tobacco-related harm. Tobacco deaths themselves would become 
part of the cost of the product that the industry would be re-
quired to internalize, not some sort of perverse public benefit 
that the industry is providing to the nation. 
Missing from this list of items that would be compensated by 
. the tobacco injury compensation program is any payment to the 
tobacco victim for two items of loss: those that are pecuniary in 
nature but covered by some other funding source, and those that 
are non-pecuniary in nature. For smokers, such an exclusion 
could be justified on the ground previously raised, namely, that 
there are limited funds with which to try to accomplish a set of 
objectives and the lowest priority claim on those funds is the 
compensation of those who participated in the production of their 
harm. 
For non-smokers, a different justification would have to be 
sought. Their participation in the harm is involuntary in all but 
the most formalistic way. It would be exceedingly harsh, for 
example, to hold that flight attendants chose to be exposed to 
77. In his fairness opinion in the Agent Orange litigation, Judge Weinstein used 
quotes from Frazer's The Golden Bough and from Abraham Lincoln's Second Inaugu-
ral Address in support of the proposition that public acknowledgement could be as 
significant as private compensation in the process of reaching closure of mass injury 
claims. In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 857, 862 
(E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
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concentrated environmental tobacco smoke as part of their em-
ployment, and that they could always have elected other work if 
they really objected to the exposure. 
If there is to be any accommodation by the compensation pro-
gram of claims for benefits that compensate for personal injury 
as such, it would be in the context of claims by non-smokers who 
have been harmed by exposure to the smoke from other people's 
use of cigarettes. Within an injury compensation system, those 
claims would present difficult scientific issues about causation, 
at least in the short run. That suggests that, again perhaps only 
in the short run, the appropriate view of the injury compensation 
system for this class of claimants is as a limited supplement to 
the other sources of compensation, rather than as a substitute 
for the wider range and larger size of the awards that might be 
obtainable in a tort recovery. 
Financing the compensation system for tobacco-related harms 
is easily accomplished through a tax on tobacco products, with 
the revenue earmarked for this purpose. AB described in a recent 
publication, such a tax would have two positive effects in the 
tobacco setting.78 First, it would generate funds to support the 
compensatory aim of the proposal, with an expectation that the 
drain on other sources of funding for those same purposes could 
be lightened. Second, it would increase the price of the tobacco 
products so that the market signals receivedby consumers would 
at least somewhat more closely correspond to the actual social 
cost of those products, with whatever beneficial health effect 
such a rise in price might produce in the form of a lower demand 
for the products. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The description of these remarks as "preliminary thoughts" is 
accurate for two reasons. First, there is a good deal to be done, 
especially in the empirical and epidemiological fields, before the 
next step of actually crafting a compensation program would be 
feasible. But second, and more importantly, this is an attempt to 
lower the rhetorical and economic stakes in the debate about 
what to do when we know as much as we now know about the 
risk of injury and death from the use of tobacco products. It 
78. LeBel, supra note 1, at 638-41. 
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ought not be a vain hope that once we have moved beyond the 
name calling and the finger pointing, we can enter into a conver-
sation about how to play an endgame that has at its core the 
interest of the public as a whole rather than just the self-interest 
of the various parties who are most directly affected by the out-
come. Serious consideration of an injury compensation system as 
an alternative to the tort litigation model could be a step in that 
direction. 
